In his classic book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson talks about the evolution of “nation-building” in the post-World War II period as one where “one sees both a genuine popular nationalist enthusiasm and a systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth.” Anderson, however, proceeds to explain the development of this “colonial nationalism” in territorial terms and the nature of the control by a “bilingual intelligentsia poised precariously over diverse monoglot populations.” What he left unexplained is the ideological genesis of this “colonial nationalism,” or more particularly what role the departing colonial master had in the shaping of its nationalist progeny.
Nationalist politics and historiography have, understandably, de-emphasized these connections, even going to the extent of denying the bond between colonial and national. This refutation all the more is strongly asserted when national independence is gained through the military defeat of the colonial power. The more significant cases, however, are those post-colonial states where no military or political “break” occurred between the colonial and the national periods, but instead “smooth transitions” or remarkably peaceful transfer of power.
The Philippines is such society. American influence continues to pervade post-colonial Philippines, eliciting unremitting criticism of an undying “colonial mentality” that had, among other things, stunted the quest for nationhood. There is very little examining of American hegemony in “Gramscian” terms, i.e., through means that appear less intrusive and more “enlightening,” but with the most far-reaching, and to nationalists, devastating effects on the national psyche.
According to Hayden, the bond between the United States and the Philippines lies first and foremost in the legacy of Western governance that the Spanish implanted and which the Americans then preserved and then improved upon. Spanish rule implanted a Latin type of regime while the U.S. an “Anglo-Saxon” one which then created a carapace upon which the Philippines was to be protected from “racial inundation by mass immigration from any other Oriental country.” This “Western legacy” was also American colonialism’s line to the Philippine Revolution. Instead of repudiating the 1896 revolt against Spain and the creation of the Malolos Republic, Hayden acknowledged how much the Revolution’s quest for national liberation resonated with themes close to American political beliefs. It was this compatibility that mitigated the dark side of early Filipino-American war relations.
Filipino participation was expanded after newly elected President Woodrow Wilson pushed through with his promise to Filipinize the colonial state. Filipinization had destroyed the institutional harmony that was brought about by Filipino-American cooperation, and endangered the entire state by placing it in the hands of relatively inexperienced Filipinos, according to Hayden.
Hayden made a textual maneuver in his book that portrayed the U.S. as a colonial regime different from the rest of the region, agreeing to “listen” to the desires of Filipinos as articulated through their “Spanish-trained” leaders and enabling Filipinos to play a major role in colonial governance and in determining the direction of national development. This transmutation from an invading force to an ally, adviser and guide to the Filipinos’ moderated nationalism provides us with the first clue to why Filipino official nationalism saw no contradiction with the ideological presence of American colonialism.
By the 1930s, Filipinos were in control of the state. At the center of colonial politics the Nacionalista Party and its leaders Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmena. The absence of any serious challenge to the Nacionalistas also meant that the only politics left were the factional battles inside the dominant party. By the time of the Commonwealth, Hayden admitted that “only a split in the Nacionalista Party could produce an effective party of opposition.” Hayden was thus arguing that Quezon’s Commonwealth was “not merely the replacement of Americans by Filipino officials,” but the evolution of something that was a definite departure from the “Anglo-American party system” [p. 453]. It was, in short, Filipino, not anymore American. Its popularity, stability, and the fact that in Quezon it had the only “chief executive perfectly qualified” (p. 68) to run the Commonwealth, meant that? despite its deviation from the “Anglo-American party system” ? it was something worth defending. And it is this critical defense of the defective that enabled Hayden and American colonialism to further embed an American presence in the Filipino official nationalism.
Hayden devoted an entire section on this “phase of development of a national state in the Philippines” that was most important, noting how enthusiastic the Filipino response had been to a bold and comprehensive American plan to provide education as part of the training “in democratic political processes”. Filipinos desired to be educated and the Americans, in Hayden’s eyes, were responding to this need. The vigorous collaboration between Filipinos and Americans in improving the educational system ensured its consolidation. Even in the Commonwealth era, Filipinos continued to work closely with their colonial mentors.
With the creation of the Bureau of Education, American-written textbooks for American children were “supplanted any texts written by Americans especially fro Filipino children” and books containing materials “prepared exclusively by Filipinos” soon after replaced those co-authored by Filipinos and Americans. By the time of the Commonwealth, the curriculum department of the Bureau was “wholly Filipino and brings to its task both the Filipino viewpoint and excellent professional training in modern education” (pp. 487-489). By 1939, the entire education bureau had come under the full political and executive control of Filipinos. Both Filipinos and Americans viewed education not merely as an instrument to modernize Filipinos, but as an important ideological rampart for any state seeking to keep itself highly legitimate in the eyes of society.
As an American, Hayden viewed the educational system mainly as a “supplement [to] the home in imparting the more formal part of the established national culture to the coming generation and to prepare the youth of the land to participate as free individuals in a national society.” The main purpose of education was “to develop the individual intellect and character,” not to serve the “specific needs of the state”; it was preservative of “traditional national institutions” not aimed at destroying or modifying them. These values however did not fit the Philippine context, and Hayden himself was first to admit that, in actual fact, the Philippine educational system resembled more “the totalitarian systems.”
Here lies the crux of the American question that puzzled Benedict Anderson. For unlike its counterparts in the region, the American project in the Philippines was both a colonial as well as a national project. Most Americans in the colony interpreted “benevolent assimilation” as something that was to eventually lead to Filipinos taking over the cudgels of the state and determining their future. The outcomes may vary in character and substance, and may sometimes lead to alterations unfamiliar to the American political experience, but it was no denying that they were the product of Filipino-American collaboration.
The reasons for such peculiarly un-colonial actions were as diverse as they were often contradictory. They ranged from an evolving view that while progressive imperialism may have brought benefits to Filipinos, the annexation of the Philippines was, in the long run, a mistake. In the eyes of officials like Theodore Roosevelt, the Philippines “were a military Achilles heel and an economic drain, and [Roosevelt] hope to set them free as soon as possible.” Racial prejudice was likewise a strong undertone when American policy-makers argued that the Philippines be best left on its own rather than be eventually added to the Union. Here we see the coming together with the Progressive notions of modernizing the state with its exclusionary attitude towards the issue of citizenship. According to Roger W. Smith, a “four-part hierarchical structure of citizenship laws” based on who should be excluded and who could become citizens among the peoples of the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico and Hawaii placed Filipinos in the same category as migrant Chinese laborers, i.e., “people denied entry to and subject to expulsion from the U.S., generally owing to their ethnic and ideological traits.” The Filipinos were considered too racially distinct, inferior and troublesome to possess any form of U.S. citizenship or nationality. Their acquisition had been imprudent. They should be tutored as subjects for a time, then gradually expelled from formal affiliation with the U.S. via independence…The U.S. should, however, maintain a guiding role.
The tutoring however would be conducted along progressive lines. The colonial state that would govern the Filipinos must strive “to bring economic, political, and moral order to their turbulent world by adopting many modern innovations while trying to sustain the finest cultural verities of the past.” This was the ideal that Hayden had in mind when he began writing his book. The outcome may have deviated from the original idea, but what the colonial state or its Republican successor could not deny was how much they were also the progeny of the Americans as they were of Filipinos.
On this acknowledged pedigree the Americans would anchor their legitimacy, and the continuing popularity of the United States as a former colonial power in the Philippines, to this very day, is an affirmation that they had succeeded. And it is this resilient reputation that continues to bedevil and haunt Filipino nationalism in its continuing struggle to bring the nation-state to its full fruition.
There have been two books recently published, the first by Cheah Boon Kheng,
Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, and Farish A Noor’s The Other Malaysia:
Writings on Malaysia’s Subaltern History, that are very different in their
outlook and
focus. Malaysia’s historians have thus far to discuss the history of Malaysia
as a nation-state, but that is currently changing.
The events of the last few years in Malaysia have encouraged discussions on history, accompanied by the rise of new public media. Farish A Noor’s book is a collection of columns written for a web page, in which he refers to a state of “radical dislocation” that makes it possible to bring in alternative and marginalized voices. Some of the marginalized voices in Malaysia are now being recorded.
The issue of academic versus popular history is also an issue that should be explored. In addition, I will touch upon socio-political paradigms and dominant discourses shaped by state practice.
In The Making of a Nation, Cheah asked “Who would inherit power from the British? Who would receive independence?”. Cheah analyses Malaysia through the prism of “give and take” examining the tension between Malay and Malaysian nationalism. Such “give and take” may seem axiomatic to the practice of even quasi-democratic parliamentary politics, but in Malaysia, “give and take” is also a political position condemned by “exclusivists.”
Cheah’s narrative begins in the post-war, pre-independence period (1945-1957). The years 1945-48 were especially crucial in deciding who would inherit the state from the British. Cheah sees in the 1948 Federation of Malaya agreement, “a major shift towards an inclusionary multi-ethnic nationalist perspective” on the part of an “enlightened leadership”. As embraced by successive UMNO prime ministers, this inclusive nationalism comprised multi-racial cooperation and common loyalty to Malaysia, a balancing of interest not always appreciated by UMNO members, especially when it was pursued for the political survival of the prime minister.
Concerning communism, Cheah points out that it is wrong to call the communist movement a “Chinese movement” not because there were significant number of non-Chinese participants, but because the Communist Party of Malaya opposed the government and its supporters, who included many Chinese.
Disunity was the rule in other communities as well. Malay anti-feudalism is cited as the best example of the flowering of Malay nationalism. Several political contests led to the independence and formation of Malaysia, including ideological challenges to communalism. At the time, the specter of class division loomed very large indeed, as revolutionary nationalist movements raged in Viet Nam and China and a “social revolution” massacred royal families in neighboring Sumatra.
Cheah gives a very dispassionate account of Malaysian history, whereas Farish A. Noor has a very different agenda. A much younger scholar, Farish is already well-known as an “academic and activist.” If Cheah, the historian, has written his history of Malaysia “as it is” using the work of political scientists, Farish, the political scientist, writes of history in order to discover what might have been. He immediately targets biases that marginalize many, as well as a “tendency to accept…essentialist categories” that distorts and cripples the majority.
I would like to talk about the idea of Malaysia. Cheah’s text constructs a smooth narrative, discussing tension between communities that is managed, limited by state practice. Farish wants to deconstruct this smooth narrative in order to create the possibility of multiculturalism. He says that “Malaysia still has a long way to go.” Farish also starts where all historians start, with Malay political primacy. Farish gives the impression of a helpless and fraught centrality however. This is a recurring theme in Malaysia literature, and articulates a frustration that can never be resolved.
From 1997 to 1999, economic and political crises provided a real rupture in discourse, in which anxiety and anger was not successfully deflected outside the Malay community as it often is when anger erupts against power and corruption. Farish uses the language of feudalism, because he is using the language of radical Malay nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s. Farish wants to point out that it wasn’t always this way, in other words it wasn’t always the case that unassailable leaders ruled the country. He focuses on elites and leaders, which is a feature of Malay history. Farish also gives the Islamic opposition party the same treatment.
In conclusion, it should be noted that much of what Farish writes is not new. The question is how it can become more effective and if books such as Farish’s are an effective way of talking to the public.
The title of this panel is “Reconstructing the National Narrative” ? we are talking about narratives of nation-building. The first case of the Philippines compares the national and the colonial, focusing on the educational policy jointly introduced in the Philippines. Studies on the Philippines are for the large part written by American authors who were in the colonial administration, and they tend to boast about their role in the colonial state.
Japan’s colonial practices share some similarities with the American case in the Philippines. However, the Japanese focused on the theme of protecting the Asian people from Western Imperialism, rhetoric that was quite different from classic colonialism. The US case was similar, with the Americans not proselytizing class colonialism, but bringing with them ideals of liberalism. The US occupation of Japan was a revival of the colonial administration in the Philippines.
Prof. Fujiwara asked Prof. Abinales how he would place Mindanao in the Philippine context.
Concerning Malaysia, the post-war state might not have been anti-colonial, but there is a disassociation. There was also a discussion concerning the differences between Malay and Malaysian identities. The use of the word feudalism is also very interesting and needs further elaboration.
In response to Prof. Fujiwara, Prof. Abinales stated that in the case of Mindanao, the presence of the US is reacted to in a pragmatic manner. One of the enduring philosophies of the US is the notion of pragmatism. People in Mindanao have accepted US troops as a means of diluting Philippine influence.
Prof. Amoroso responded by stating that feudalism and neo-feudalism are precisely the right words to use, implying the continuity of colonial-type rule and support of traditional elites.
Professor Ileto spoke about “official” versus “unofficial” nationalism, noting that these terms were a throw back to the language employed in the 1920s and 1930s. He asked whether Hayden actually acknowledged the area of “unofficial” nationalism. He also posed a question to Prof. Amoroso concerning Farish A. Noor, pointing out that Farish is based in the Netherlands, whereas Cheah is based in Malaysia but is of Chinese origin.
Prof. Amoroso responded that while it is true that Farish A. Noor lives in somewhere other than Malaysia, she could not answer the question. She pointed out that the website from which Farish writes is physically based in Malaysia. Concerning the two authors ethnicity, Prof. Amoroso stated her preference not to mention ethnicity. Concerning communalism and Islam, she pointed out that in the 1960s the concept of a Malay nationality was raised, and attempts have been made to narrow Malay identity down to Islamic roots. She explained that Farish critiques both leaders and Islamic nationalism.
Prof. Abinales responded that the Philippines was not the only country occupied by the United States: Hawaii, Cuba, Guam and Alaska also suffered the same fate. He stated that what should be done is to analyze the political situation in the United States at the turn of the century.
Prof. Nagano expressed her concern about how to consider the US period of colonialism in the Philippines. She asked Prof. Abinales whether he thought US colonialism should be differentiated in periods over its 50-year duration. She suggested that prior to World War I, the US colonial state was very fragile and it came into its own during the 1920s.
Prof. Abinales responded that the weakness of the colonial state in the Philippines was the US’s lack of will to remain, and the lack of US funds to support the colonial government. He mentioned that unlike the British, the Americans did not know how to create a colonial state. He stated that perceptions and policies began to change in the 1920s.
Prof. Fujiwara agreed with Prof. Nagano that the colonial state was strengthened after World War I, but that the character of rule was being changed, and that this was also the case in the British colonies.
Prof. Takenaka stated that the discussion around communalism is quite different in Malaysia and India. She stated that in India it is often said that communalism is a result of British colonial rule. She also referred to the concept of Malay and Malaysian.
Prof. Amoroso agreed that British colonialism was very much to blame for communalism, through immigration and census categories. Concerning the meaning of “Malaysia”, Prof. Amoroso explained that there were many words in the “Malay” “Malayan” “Malaysian” vocabulary, and the issue is still not resolved and is open to a great deal of interpretation.
Prof. Morris-Suzuki also raised the issue of colonial power in nation building. She pointed out that there was a period in empires when the colonial power realized that independence would happen, and the emphasis from that point on was how to prepare for independence.