



## Session 3: Discussion Highlights

**MICHEAL G. WATSON:** I think the two discussants deserve a round of applause, so let us give a hand to the two of them. That was pretty fascinating. Now let us hear responses first from Professor Daqing Yang and then after that, I hope you are all thinking about your questions for the final session.

**DAQING YANG:** At the beginning of my presentation, I said that many of my ideas are half-baked and yet I present them in the hope that I will get more suggestions and criticisms. In Chinese there is a saying that you “invite jade by presenting clay brick,” and I see this is already working. To respond to Shinohara-san’s comment that a historian writing on international conflict or a historian writing on any subject should be neutral and detached, I sort of understand where you are coming from and what you are suggesting here. And I very much sympathize with it, but at the same time I think it is nearly impossible to do that because any history is not simply just a list of facts, you know, on this day, so and so died. It is not just these dry facts, but it has also to be strung together to make a coherent story, especially if you want to make an explanation: to explain, not just to describe, but also explain why things happen. And you give different weight to different actors, and that often sort of reflects your presumptions and sympathies.

And in connection to your question at the very end, you think I am very optimistic and you ask rightfully what kind of history I intend to write. And I thought about this issue on the subject of Nanjing. And it is perhaps the most divisive history subject between Japan and China. And I do not want to let self-reflection become debilitating to the point that we cannot write history, so I do have a tentative sort of project. And rather than writing a grand history or total history that most published history on the subject in both Japan and China on the subject of Nanjing seems to be, I think it is probably more fruitful to write a sort of micro history focusing on perhaps a particular unit in the

Japanese military on the basis of their soldiers' diaries, their commander's diaries, as well as the wartime official records, which will enable the author to give a sort of a thick description of the experience, of the perspectives of both high and low of the particular small unit as they experienced the development of the war in China, the brutalization. And at the same time, try to incorporate Chinese voices, and as what I quoted Charles Maier's suggestions, to bring victims and the perpetrators together. And I think such a project is doable on the basis of available evidence, and that I think that is necessary because in the debate, apart from facts about how many people died, I think another sort of a conflict is why it happened. Was it because of Japanese mentality or Japanese culture as Iris Chang's bestseller, *The Rape of Nanjing*, seems to imply? Or was it simply Japanese militarism as official Chinese history often indicates, which somehow lacks persuasiveness? I think a project that focuses on a small unit within this event known as the Nanjing Massacre, through this thick description, might accomplish what I had to suggest it, as a history that can ring true in both Japan and China. And that is a project I hope to be able to write in the next few years.

To Kiichi's (Fujiwara's) question about revisionism, what about revisionism, I completely share your frustration at the term revisionism being used in such loose ways, so that only the so-called right wing revisionists somehow claim this term, whereas the left in this case seem to be defending an outdated truth. In this case, I think one way to get out of this dilemma, in English anyway, is to use revisionism with a capital "R" because those so-called revisionist historians, the self-claimed revisionists, in fact do not have a monopoly on the term revisionism and I think the life line of historiography is through constant revisionism, where that is a revisionism with a small "r". And that way, I think, we can sort of stay away from that false dichotomy that somehow, you know, the liberal and the left are defending the outdated truth. Of course there is a problem, I feel, in the Chinese historiography that tends to equate, for example, the verdicts of Tokyo war crime trials as something that cannot be tinkered with; even the slightest degree of revisionism is often equated with right wing nationalism in Japan. I think that is, in my view, an overreaction that is counterproductive. The liberal universal history, you might remember that I did not use the word universal

history, and I am aware of the various ideological burdens associated with it. I am somewhat hopeful however that historians from different countries can still, through persistent dialogue with each other, create a kind of trans-national history that may or may not be universal history, but at least is trans-national, a break away from the confines of a sort of national framework, and that is essentially what my goal is.

**WATSON:** Well, it is five after five. We have a plenty of time before the reception. So I would like to call on questions or comments from the audience. That includes, of course, both the speakers today and those who have participated as discussants, and those who have come in the middle of discussion.

**PATRISIO N. ABINALES:** I would like to point out two things to Professor Yang. One of them, the question of state: the standing of mass education has never been solved, in part because it is the way of uniting the states. You think the way the state as a diplomat and also as one within the context of educational institution in Japan, vis-à-vis China. Each of the two is an organ. It's very strange, because two modern states, China and Japan. I think the security importance, too. In terms of legitimacy, such a debate on the Nanjing Massacre probably is equated to dealing with the security.

This leads to the second point, the idea of trans-national historical writing. It is interesting. What extent is it easy? Trans-national writing will be a critique of both states. Therefore, just my different impression, the way Japanese historians refuse to write this criticism of the state in trans-national historical writing. It should be very tough. No, serious. Chinese historians, too, emphasize more arguments. And, you know, good luck. Please write trans-nationally, but because it's not only the critique of the state, but the critique of regimes of truth in itself, which give two systems a great pity to secure modern states and to secure academic institutions. This leads to the third point. Is it possible to write trans-nationally, and setting where? Both sides have never emphasized the word, freedom. Academics in China must go to the party line unless go to jails. In the case of Japan, in a sense, they are but all good salary men, instead of challenging the state. Comments and

self-reflection, thank you.

**KEI TAKEUCHI:** I think that Azuma's case was unfortunate. Because it became a law case, and the regime of history will be different from the regime of truth. In a court, these things will be decided: some specific person did commit some specific crime at some specific time. That is nothing to do with actually what happened there. Well, this is two faces of history. I think, it was unfortunate that Chinese public and Japanese public took it as a case to establish a historical truth. But that is not the case. I am not saying that micro-history should be out of sight of historians. So, I strongly support Prof. Yang's proposal to do micro history. Because it is very important to know who did commit the crime and who was responsible for that? Before, usually Marxist historians said that most of Japanese were rather victims of imperialism and only a small number of imperialists did commit the war crimes. So, Japanese people were not guilty. But now in the atmosphere of nationalism, general nation as a whole is considered to be guilty. Sometimes, even so-called conscientious Japanese people say that we, as a whole nation, should be responsible for the war crime. I do not think it is a correct way to do that. What we have to do is, to clarify who actually committed a crime, and who should be condemned. This is the first step to establish a truth of history. I strongly support your recommendation to dig into more details.

**TAKAO TAKAHARA:** I have a small question. When I was talking about Nanjing Massacre and Japanese atrocities with my Chinese scholar, he insisted the number of victims, three hundred thousands. I could understand that. If an American scholar comes here to describe the number of victims in Hiroshima, less than the estimate of Japanese side, our reaction would be emotional. On the other hand, as a scholar, we should be able to speak this issue. When is this particular figure, three hundred thousands, accepted among Chinese people? How should we understand the difference of two regimes of truth? Because, my Chinese friend and I totally agreed on Japanese aggression and atrocities at the time of war, but could not agree on how to do with this figure.

**YANG:** The reason I try to use this term or concept, "regime of truth," is to really make a sense of some of those phenomena that you have described. It

seems to me that this figure has commanded such credibility among Chinese historians or the public and how they view the entire Nanjing Massacre and how they view the entire war between Japan and China, as an enormous sort of atrocities or Japanese aggression. Within that context and within the Chinese rules of evidence, by which I mean, after all, this figure is largely based on Chinese sources that appear to be credible enough to Chinese historians. Therefore, they have no reason to doubt that this figure cannot be true.

Whereas in the Japanese case, from the left to the right, I think despite this ideological difference from people who deny the Nanjing Massacre happened to people who believe the Nanjing Massacre happened, there seems to be a certain general agreement in that that figure is not reliable. And the basis for that is, and I would say, to look at the honest historians, that it is not based on credible evidence. And that credible evidence, most of which I think are Japanese sources, and they, Japanese historians, in this case, tend to be more sceptical about certain Chinese sources, which I think may well be justified.

So the regime of truth in this case seems to help me at least to understand why, despite ideological differences in Japan, there is such a national difference between Japan and China in issues like the figure. Whereas you know, the Chinese find it credible, on Japan's side even the most sympathetic historians find it not very credible. Does that answer your question about how you make a sense of such adamant insistence? I would say that that figure somehow meets the rule of proof to someone within the Chinese regime of truth.

**TAKAHARA:** This regime of truth, is there any discussion about changing the regime of truth? What makes changes or who are making changes?

**YANG:** Well, you would have to ask Foucault, and I am sort of making my own interpretations here. I think, yes, they are subjects to change. I think it would be interesting, I have not really looked into it but it would be interesting to see what kind of political, intellectual environment within China as well as the

relationship with Japan will help alter that regime of truth on the issue of World War II. I cannot give you a more specific, dynamic account of how this will change.

I mean this regime of truth, in a way, it is already different from what had existed before, that based on a strict class analysis dictated essentially by the *People's Daily*. Whereas now, it is much more pluralistic, of course not in the full sense like a pluralistic society, nonetheless I think in China, it is no longer dictated from the top, as one of the questions seem to suggest that if there is no personal freedom, then that means everything is dictated from the top. I do not think that is quite the case. And I gave the example of the mass media. There is commercialization today in China, and many of writings are written essentially to make money. And so, a kind of sensationalization is certainly not something ordered by the state. It is probably individually motivated. And that actually has an impact on the popular perception of the war.

And this question on whether the Azuma case is a good example, I think I probably agree with you that the legal definition of truth is not a quite the same as historical, of historians' definition, truth. I basically use this example because it shows a different national response to this event. So I could have used this number as an example where there seems to be a national divide. Partly because I have been in touch with many Japanese historians who work on this subject, I sense that Azuma is radioactive material because of this reputation of falsification attached to it, and so has become a very dangerous label for any empirically minded historian in Japan.

On the question of whether it is possible to write a trans-national history as I indicated, I think it is possible to write it, but it is one thing for someone to write a history that can be accepted in different countries. In this case, I think Fujiwara-san's book, *Remembering the War*, is already translated into Chinese and will be published there, and I think that is one example. It is not exactly a narrative history, but still it is an example of how you can produce scholarship for a trans-national audience. I think it is more difficult, however, to affect this overall regime of truth, affect the overall discourse on the war.

And that is more difficult. An individual piece of scholarship is not that difficult, or in a short hand to produce a trans-national regime of truth, I think that is what history textbooks can in a way symbolize, because it affects a much wider audience and that it perhaps is more difficult, but I would like to think it not entirely impossible.

Whether histories on the war or on the Nanjing atrocities only serve to legitimize the state, I am not so sure. I am thinking it has everything to do with the nation and the nation's history and the nation's culpability, such as the case of Japan or the Chinese nation as a victim of foreign aggression. And in this case, it does not have to legitimize the state per se. Put it this way, I think that is why it helps me to look at Japan and Korea, because Korea is a post-authoritarian society and yet its historians are often accused of being very nationalistic, and as you know, and have problems reaching a consensus with the Japanese historians. And I see a post-communist China quite possibly in the same vein. And nationalism can come from the bottom up, and not just a top down, serving the state. And that also is not an issue of individual freedom per se. I think even a free individual can choose to write a nationalistic history.

**ABINALES:** Yes and no, yes, he can, but he can never neglect a possible blow to write in public in China these days. It is so sorry to say this from my human imaginative, or I might be wrong. Routinely, some historians in Japan on the Nanjing Massacre are saying that, part of this correctism, real Japan is more civilized than China, because it's older, and its politics, and the massacre. You are right, there is bourgeois institution now. I think it is still political system that only tolerates individual writing to some extent. I think you will be one of the creators of trans-national history, precisely because you are away. It is the society where such a free world, it is legalism, individual right, legal critical history, bourgeois society, less police and censor, even in Japan, even in democratized Korea. That is the respect I said. This is the context in which, I thought, has been maintained in the debate on the Nanjing Massacre, not solving it. For Chinese government and Japanese government, you know, those states.

**KIICHI FUJIWARA:** I am not sure if I am allowed to jump in here, but empirically speaking I am not really sure about that, really, honestly. I hope that I am right. I am not sure, but I am going to Beijing University in this month and I will be giving a talk, a series of talks about war memories in Japan, of war topics. So it is going to be a difficult thing.

But public views on the war may be far more diverse than what we may assume from writing, say, for example, writing on inter-net bulletin boards. And also war memories are very volatile. It is worthwhile to remember, focus on certain war memories which are supposed to stay there forever, actually change. Look at the demise of Hiroshima in Japanese war memories. Nowadays, it is either Okinawa or Nanjing, while Hiroshima, at the cornerstone of Japanese war memory, has somehow demised. I am not sure if it will go on like that. It might, you know, re-emerge or things like that. And if war memories and arguments that go with it are volatile and change by time and also could be quite diverse, it may not do to take the heated moments of a sort of a controversy and assume that it will stay that way. And the additional thing is that on the Japanese case, in 1993 when Hosokawa assumed office, he was the first Japanese Prime Minister to openly make an apology about Japanese war crimes. And there had been a series of apologies which were all very insincere. Hosokawa's was quite different. What is more important is that after that, Hosokawa's approval rating shot up. So assuming that the Japanese are guarded and do not really want to face the issue may be quite exaggerated. And in fact I have a firm prejudice that all this may not be about the masses but only about a group of intellectuals. Thanks.

**WATSON:** I would like to suggest that we turn off this central light which directs all attention to the stage because I want us all to be in a nice circle here, not just to focus on only Japan and China, but on nationalism in general, writing history, reading history, and so on. Look at each other, and we have enough number of microphones. Let's continue our discussion, more generally. For example, Shinohara-san's comment on healthy nationalism.

**YANG:** I think this brings us to Professor Takeuchi's early keynote speech about benign nationalism. Is that close to Mr. Shinohara's "healthy



nationalism”?

**TAKEUCHI:** I do not think we should sort of foster a good or healthy nationalism. But I simply think that nationalism is there, and the important thing is to make nationalism as harmless as possible. And if we pay a little attention to that, nationalism could become quite harmful. It can turn out to be aggressive, coarse and things like that, so that what I am saying is that I would like to make nationalism as benign as possible. And fortunately, nationalism of the Japanese public more or less remains stable. So I am not saying that we should confuse healthy nationalism, but I think that nationalism is there, and we have to make it as benign as possible, as harmless as possible.

**WATSON:** I want to interrupt you a little bit as a chair. I do study *Heike Monogatari* as Japanese narrative and historiography in the medieval age. And it is the story of the first national war in Japan. In some ways, there were later wars that took place all over Japan, but a war that took place in the 1180's in three major islands of Japan. Hokkaido was not a part of Japan as a country then. What is nationalistic about this in a benign sense? Is that a sense of national identity of people all over Japan? There were mentions of other countries, Korea and China, but simply the concepts of East Japan, West Japan, the capital, and other areas of Japan, that consciousness of a broader nation is at work there. I found the discussion very interesting. For example, the question of the historical truth, the word truth or falsehood hardly ever occurs in such a medieval work. It does not say if it was true or that something happened. What they often say is, something may have happened, some thing might have happened. It probably happened, or according to another event, according to another account, it happened. So in this medieval work which was written in the 13<sup>th</sup> century in the present form, they do not try to determine exactly what happened. They simply collect alternate accounts of possible things that might have happened, and one of the things we see is that they were very interested with eye witnesses or people who saw or heard. And so even from this very early stage of Japanese historical book accounts, there is an interest in the bottom up, the micro history, the history of the *azuma nobushi*, the eastern warriors. Anyway, sorry.

**REYNALDO C. ILETO:** So I just wanted to comment on Professor Shinohara's remark about good nationalism or benign nationalism. I think that as I see it, it is a problematic concern, the writing of history, and it seems to me that any community, any regional group, or even a group which identifies a nation, needs or wants a history. And we are among the various people who are in the business of writing history and we could be in the position of writing a history for a community. And so it is not a question of whether we want or do not want to write a history that somehow connects us with problems about nationalism. When we write history, that history, even though it is a history on a very innocuous topic, is read by a hundred thousand people, somehow you are addressing a community that in some way begins to develop certain ties among its members as a result of what you have written, even if you have not consciously written a nationalist history. The question will become that of how to write a history for a community, in a way to believe in exclusionary practices or not to serve the designs of the state. Such designs are not for the good of the members of the community. That is one point.

I wanted to comment on Professor Abinales' last comment that if Dr. Daqing Yang may be the only person really able to write a trans-national history effectively because he is in neither state. I think that there is a linguistic celebration of individualism and all the things that one associates with American liberal democracy, but I wonder if one were to write a history not about the Nanjing Massacre but about even the Balangiga Massacre in Samar of the American soldiers, the American soldiers of war. I wonder to what extent if such a history affect the American national imaginary, if it will make a real effect on the way Americans think about this incident involving their army. I wonder to what extent America would be a very good reasonable place to develop that sort of history. So it depends. The location of Dr. Daqing Yang is favorable perhaps because the Nanjing Massacre or whatever the outcome of the research is coming to the positive value of responses in the United States. I keep on going back to our problem in the Philippines of establishing a trans-national regime of truth that would recognize a war in the Philippines that resulted in around half a million deaths. We are not even arguing about the numbers, about the numbers given by the American generals. It is the fact of inserting that whole question of existence of the war into the

consciousness of a population. That is a problem of the regime of truth in a very serious sense.

**YOSHIKO NAGANO:** I am glad to be here today because I gained a lot of insights from discussion, but if I were here five years ago or three years ago, I could not agree with the discussion very much, because I used to be familiar with economic history but did not identify myself as a historian at all. But I come across a lot of recent debate in history and through that debate, and I became interested in thinking about what nationalism is, or how we can write history. The discussion and the session of Prof. Iletto's paper, I really appreciated Prof. Iletto's work, *Pasyon and Revolution*, but as you might know somehow his work was severely criticized five years ago, in 1997, that is the way I wrote in my book on the Philippine history. I do not repeat its critique anymore here, but I really take that issue very seriously, because as I mentioned Prof. Iletto's work, *Pasyon and Revolution*, was highly appreciated in the United States in the 1980s. But in the late 1990s it was criticized by one prominent American scholar, Glenn May. I do not want to think that this debate and the change of appreciation of his book were caused by individual problems. I think there was a change of the trend in thinking about his work or in thinking about nationalism in Asian countries.

In my view, I think this really relates to how nationalism was seen during the Cold War as well as before the post-Cold War. So I think there is slightly more pressure to think about nationalism after the end of Cold War than before the end of the Cold War. So when we discuss what nationalism is, what history is, or how can we write history, I think that a watershed or an important point of change was in early 1990s. Because we are living in the present state, so we think history from the present. When we write history, we have to identify and recognize the past unconsciously with the present. We are thinking about the present and looking at the past. This is really the cause of the change of appreciation of Prof. Iletto's work. When we discuss nationalism or what we can write as history, it is important to understand how we can think at the present stage, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**ABINALES:** I was just struck by May's kind of way to put emphasis on legal

witness so much outside the nation of United States, too. Despite it, returning to Prof. Yang's writing, if someone is writing very controversial episodes in those three countries, to what extent one writes even temporarily about the restrictions imposed on state educational institutions, national moral anger, even intellectuals' self-censorship. And write more meaningful, more objective, more credible history of the Nanjing Massacre. That, I think, not so much because of difference of their systems. Even though, to compare the kind of academic setting in the United States with that in Japan or Korea, I would still feel highly capable of writing about the Nanjing Massacre from George Washington University.

I think you also raised a particular point, which is still interesting thing about an intellectual *rentai* of Rey and Prof. Yang, writing about the society, but from outside of the society. To what extent, the question reflects then, to what extent that affects one's nationalism, to what extent that causes a grave effect on original change or notion of nationalism. That's sort of comparison comes not only from the Pacific, but in Professor Sarkar's proceedings, she even pointed out a sense of exile, rapidly politicized or exercised in Indian political community. To what extent, even being in and out of the society. That is the issue, a temporary distance for Professor Yang to do a trans-national writing better than people who live in Beijing and Tokyo.

**WATSON:** Would you respond, Prof. Sarkar? I am sure there are massive changes in India. And also I would be curious to ask, since references to people who are studying culture that is outside of their culture. There is obviously a massive study of India outside India by both Indians who live abroad and non-Indians. Do you see their study of history in any way is different from yours, the study done by those living and working in New Delhi ?

**TANIKA SARKAR:** I do not really want to take too much of politics of location. I hope it is possible and has been possible to write all kinds of history, everywhere, you know, in India, particularly, Thai history coming up, and so on. So, the Subaltern Studies, for instance, there are a few founding members who still live in India, and they are still responded by someone who stop living in India, and so on. The school still cuts across on this diverse kind of location.

So, I do not think, you know, it is more of identifying history, then you would be identifying with what is going on anywhere in the world. If there is a place where you feel secure, comfortable, completely at home, so then you can write history. I do not know whether people living in a different country will like to write a different kind of history for the favour of the United States, or not.

**WATSON:** I was thinking as we were talking about trans-national history. The whole question is about, can someone from the south of England write a history of England which is fair to the north of England? Can someone from Kanto and Kansai, can someone from the Hondo of Japan write about Okinawa in a way? There are all these issues, are there not? Yes, well of course they can, but yes, of course there are limitations. Any questions? We still have some time. We have about 15 minutes. Yes, go ahead.

**CHIHARU TAKENAKA:** We have heard lots of voices from the Philippine studies, so I felt the Indian side should raise a voice. I think I am becoming a nationalist, a little bit. Anyway, I think that Shinohara-san's comment is very interesting. Because, you know, when I started learning Indian history, and it was in the early 1980s when the Indian National Congress was still dominant. I thought, yes, Indian nationalism was all right but a little boring, because the Congress always came into power again. And the Congress said, India is a secular country, we have democracy all right, we allow the minorities to live in our society safely, and we have Indian way of socialism, of course. Looking back, maybe we could call it benign nationalism, although lots of people criticized it then, especially, leftist historians who wanted to write history from below. And although the revolutionaries were not satisfied with that kind of benign nationalism at that time, if we compare today's *Hindutva* nationalism with nationalism preached by the Congress in the 1970s and 1980s, in spite of the undemocratic emergency period under Indira Gandhi, I think I could call the old Congress's form of nationalism rather benign.

And as Shinohara-san said, historians should be neutral, I certainly hope so, and I agree that history also gives a kind of identity to group consciousness. That is true. But when I look back on these two decades of Indian politics, especially in the 1990s, identity politics is really competing and

giving dynamism to the society. It is not only the Hindu majority side raising the voices of history and national identity. Actually, other communities are also giving voices and assertions through the rising of new political parties or other forms of resistance. So, I do not know how you are going to cope with national identity politics with other identity politics inside in India.

It is not like Yugoslavia. But Indian politics has been changed a lot, and historical discourse is one of the main stages of the competition in identity politics. And whenever we talk about multiculturalism of the United States or developed societies, I feel that secularism in India is a unique experiment of multiculturalism to establish a nation–state based on a society which is poor and composed of severe historical differences, a lot of class struggles and political fights. But this principle is still maintained in India, though it is not easy for Indian people to keep secularism as it was. Like the way Americans used to say that multiculturalism is important to absorb minorities, or to give voices to minorities. When I see India or South Asia, of course, I know that trans–nationalism is very important such as India–Bangladesh, India–Pakistan, India–Sri Lanka or regionalism in South Asia as a whole. But if you see the situation inside India, there are already lots of sub–national histories competing with each other, with national history. And national history is no longer even a Congress–type benign history. That is *Hindutva*–type history now.

In this context, I think, the political debate and historians’ works are always targeted, and violence, the memory of the violence, becomes a target of politics. Not only the actual actors in history, say, “victims and perpetrators” in the past, talk about violent memories. But the contemporary actors who want to manipulate identity politics today within the context of election or violence like war, massacre or communal violence, they repeat quoting memories of violence of more than 50 years ago, such as the Partition in the Subcontinent or the Second World War in Japan. They use popular memories. They say that we were the victims and we have to revenge the enemy. I think, because I am a political scientist, too, I am sure that violence is a very crucial topic here.

**FUJIWARA:** When we talk about trans-national history, it sounds so heavy and so artificial and so cold that nobody may want to read it. But then it may be worthwhile to remember that the other extreme, a 'nation-bound' history, is also quite artificial. Let us assume that all truth and all historical findings should be limited to a given national boundary. You have your own history, and we have our own and there are no ways to communicate each other, because we are talking about something totally different. Now this would be another extremely bizarre position, one that argues that all historical findings should be nation-bound and that there is no communication between each other. This argument is also called artificial, that very few people I believe will accept, so there is something in between here.

On the one hand, all writings with their own language base are addressed to a certain audience, and that audience may be in many ways limited by certain cultural traits or area of location even within a nationality. And having said that, if we stick to professional historiography, there are two things that may be happily neglected, and that is recognition and meaning. Many readers of history are not only reading history to learn about the past, but to find their face in the past, a search for their own fate and recognition. And if these experiences are not written down in a history textbook, there will be a movement that demands recognition. I have a twisted sense of nationalism, because I always envy the Chinese and the Koreans as their atrocities are somehow reported in Japan, I myself being a Southeast Asianist, so what happens and what we do in the Philippines are not that well covered. In my small area of work, I covered the atrocities in Singapore when I was supposed to be covering Nanjing. And I do not think I have any good excuse for that, but with a twisted sense of nationalism, I want to pay attention to more underrepresented histories. Now the trouble is that there is a whole group for demands for the recognition of a historical past, which easily competes with the professional standards of historiography, and how to reconcile the demands for recognition, and more conventional historical writing would be one thing we will be forced to respond to.

The second thing is the question on moral and justice. What is related to this quest for recognition and meaning is another peculiar kind of

history which is dominated by victims, villains, heroes and justice. The problem is that those who argue against nationalist history may still think, may still stick to this victor and villain kind of a morality story. You can take a look at the fate of Holocaust studies and the fate of historians there, where Hans Mommsen or Hans-Ulrich Wehler and some of the most respected historians in Germany were brutally criticized because they were not arguing that the Nazis were wrong. In fact, they did assume that the Nazis were wrong, but they did not repeat that the Nazis were wrong, and that we should then get rid of Nazis in the future. That was not what Hans Mommsen called history, but that is what the public demanded. In fact, there is a truth and moral in our daily life, so we cannot easily disregard. And these will, after all, play a large role in our setting of a historical hypothesis. But on the other hand, we also think or assume that our study would not be a play or discovery part of a play. So the question of morality, justice and social science would sneak into.

The following thing, of course, is the audience, whom you talk to. On this matter, I think I have to take a different viewpoint from Jojo (Abinales), because I am not very sure if location plays a critical role in the audience or a writer. And having said that, there is still the actual kind of audience we are addressing. If we address to a group of professional historians or professional readers, then it does not really matter where you are writing. But for example in Japan, when you are writing in newspapers, instead of academic journals, the kind of audience you choose would bind the kind of argument you make, and actually it is this choice of a wider versus a more professional audience that may play a greater role in the kind of topic we discuss and the kind of conclusion we draw. Now, of course it would be very easy if we could limit our audience to professionals, but then there comes the last question, do historians mean anything? If historians want to reach out to a smaller well-defined professional public, then we will immediately need this question opposed. So the question of recognition, morality, and audience, and, of course, as usual I do not have an answer, but please, if you have any.

**WATSON:** Well as usual Professor Fujiwara, there are so many questions. We could have another symposium just on those questions, but would anybody like to respond?



**HATSUE SHINOHARA:** The reason why I brought up the issue of healthy nationalism is that we had that preliminary discussion yesterday, and in my memo, there were lines, such as national identity or whether we need national history? I think Professor Takenaka used the term “national identity.” And I was thinking about it last night, and probably yes, for some kind of identity, or self-consciousness, probably history can do something good. And I am familiar with history, American history, and I am thinking of the situation for African Americans or Native Americans. They are looking for some kind of identity or ethnic cohesiveness. They are looking for the past, and are looking for an answer of their identity in their past, and so I thought that history can do something good. But now in the time of globalism, when you think of a nation-state, excessive nationalists, of course, and other excessive nationalisms based on history can do harm. So we really have to think in which context. Sometimes, I am not so clear about this idea, but in some cases, yes, history can contribute to benign or healthy, I do not know if I should use the word, nationalism or national identity.

**NORIO SUZUKI (Aichi University):** I am not a historian, so I have a little impression on what speakers and discussants talked today. When I saw the title of this workshop, “Can We Write History?”, I immediately remembered one of the diplomats of Singapore who wrote the book, *Can Asians Think?* So maybe there are some similarities between these questions. I think when we are asking what history is, or writing history or something like that, maybe, we are asked what kind of ideas we are able to have in this time. One of my friends in London University, Sunil Khilnani wrote a book, *The Idea of India*. Also I am always thinking about what is the idea of Asia, something like that. And Dr. Yang, in talking about the future of trans-national history, is there any possibility of a non-trans-national history or a regional history? That is my comment. If you have something about that, please respond.

**YANG:** Thank you, you have given me an opportunity to respond to Kiichi’s (Fujiwara’s) assertion that trans-national history is very artificial. There are developments in the material world, for example, trans-national movement of people, movement of goods, or trans-national media or the term globalization. It is something that is happening and therefore I agree with the other part of

Kiichi's argument that to dig into that kind of a national history is a way to preserve an identity against the onslaught of the globalizing trend. While understandable, I think that is more likely to be doomed to fail, whereas the trans-national trend will give a more, a sort of push toward a trans-national consciousness or trans-national identity, or in this case, regional identity in Asia, for example. I would hesitate to say an Asian regional identity because Asia is so diverse that we cannot really have an Asian community like that of Europe. But I think something is going on in East Asia, to say at least, maybe including Southeast Asia, in terms of the political economic trend that gave trans-national history certain timeliness. So what I am trying to say is that trans-national history is not something just to be cooked in my mind, but I think there is some reality to that. Then, I bring you to a question, a historian's role giving agency, giving a voice to what kind of a group and what kind of consciousness. I would feel uncomfortable that the historian's primary role is to give national consciousness. I mean, in a certain context, it may be well justified, but I think we need to go beyond this nationalist or national sort of a framework, and we may be required to give a voice to a sub-national, gender or social group in addition to that trans-national trend. That is where I see trans-national history to be.

**WATSON:** Well that brings us very nicely to six o'clock. I think there are so many more things we could discuss, but at least I think there were a lot of questions today, I am not going to try to summarize them. But of course one of the big questions is: what can we learn from our own history? What can we learn from each others' history and how can we share this? What can we learn from regional history? Well, no doubt there is another symposium in preparation by the Institute for International Studies, which is part of the Department of International Studies of Meiji Gakuin University. Thank you very much for your contribution today, and let's adjourn our meeting.